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The Domestic Violence Clause in
'New Originalisf Theory
by MARK S. STEIN*
Introduction
The Domestic Violence Clause in Article IV, Section 4 of the
Constitution has recently assumed some importance in the
originalism debate. That Section provides: "The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."1
Professor Jack Balkin, a recent convert to originalism, has used
the Domestic Violence Clause to provide an example of an
impermissible departure from original meaning: the hypothetical
application of the Clause to spousal abuse. In Framework
Originalism and the Living Constitution, Balkin states:
Fidelity to "original meaning" in constitutional
interpretation refers only to... the semantic content of the
words in the clause. We follow the original meaning of words in
order to preserve the Constitution's legal meaning over time, as
required by the rule of law. Otherwise, if the dictionary
definitions of words changed over time, their legal effect would
also change, not because of any conscious act of lawmaking (or
even political mobilization), but merely because of changes in
language. So, for example, when Article IV says that the
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1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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United States must protect the states from "domestic violence,"
we should employ the original meaning, "riots" or
"insurrections," not the contemporary meaning, "spousal
assaults."2
Balkin offers the same example in Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, noting that "[i]f we used the
contemporary meaning of the [Domestic Violence Clause] rather
than its original meaning, the import of the Clause would be
completely altered. Moreover it would be altered not due to any
change in public values, but simply because linguistic usage had
changed."3
Professor Lawrence Solum also makes extensive use of this
example in support of his originalist theory.4 Solum agrees with
Balkin's principle of fidelity to original meaning. In addition, Solum
uses the Domestic Violence Clause to illustrate a thesis about
language: his "fixation thesis" that the meaning of constitutional
provisions cannot change.'
I argue in this Essay that the Domestic Violence Clause provides
less support to the originalist theories of Balkin and Solum than they
believe. In Part I, I address Balkin's treatment of the Clause. In Part
II, I address Solum's treatment. I also use the hypothetical
application of the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal abuse as a
springboard for observations on such matters as the distinction
between original meaning and original expected applications. These
observations may be of interest even to those who totally reject the
more polemical aspects of this Essay.
I. Balkin on the Domestic Violence Clause
At first blush, it seems Balkin is right to suggest that it would be
absurd to apply the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal assaults.
However, I believe that the constitutional term "domestic violence"
could evolve so that such an application of the Domestic Violence
Clause no longer seems absurd. This evolution could involve a
2. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 549,552 (2009).
3. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 430 (2007).
4. Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 3-4, 64-65, 172 (I11. Pub. Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1120244. Solum credits Balkin for the example. Id. at 4.
5. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
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"change in public values," in Balkin's words.6  Moreover, the
contemporary conventional meaning of the term "domestic violence"
could be an element in this evolution.
A. An Imaginary History of the Domestic Violence Clause
Consider the following imaginary history of the Domestic
Violence Clause. Before the Civil War, the Clause was applied only
to insurrections against state authority In the late nineteenth
century, the Clause was applied to gang warfare. In the mid-
twentieth century, it was applied to ordinary street crime. Then, in
the late twentieth century, it was applied to spousal assaults. These
expansions of the Domestic Violence Clause were challenged in the
courts, and all were upheld by the Supreme Court. In upholding the
application of the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal assaults, the
Court noted evolving attitudes that see crime within a state as a
problem requiring federal assistance, and that further see crime
within the home as a problem of public concern. The Court also
observed that the conventional semantic meaning of the term
"domestic violence" includes spousal assaults. Although not in itself
enough to justify expanding the constitutional term "domestic
violence" to include spousal assaults, the Court said, this newer
conventional meaning of the term "domestic violence" connotes that
violence within the home is a problem of public concern. That
represents a shift in attitude from the founding generation: While
some men of the founding generation undoubtedly thought wife
beating was immoral, they did not see it as a major problem of public
concern.
The expansion of the constitutional term "domestic violence" as
described in this imaginary history would not be my ideal course of
constitutional development. The federal government can only
exercise power under the Domestic Violence Clause at the request of
6. Balkin, supra note 3, at 430.
7. In fact, a major expected application of the Clause was the suppression of slave
revolts. See Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime,
and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 33
n.202 (1997) (understated observation that "[t]here is some evidence that the Framers
were also concerned with slave insurrections."); Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for
the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 466
(1999) (summarizing relevant debates in the Constitutional Convention, in which the
Southern states voted as a bloc).
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state governments. 8 I believe there should be federal authority over
all crime under the Commerce Clause9 and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.' ° Federal authority should also be exercisable, at least to the
extent it is today, through difficult-to-refuse conditional grants under
the Spending Clause. 1 But given my imaginary history, I hope that
the application of the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal abuse no
longer seems ridiculous. Indeed, if the Commerce Clause and the
Spending Clause had received much narrower interpretations, the
Domestic Violence Clause might have evolved in this way. 2
In fairness to Balkin and Solum, the application of the Domestic
Violence Clause to spousal abuse that I have hypothesized does not
occur by the route they consider and reject. They evidently
contemplate that the Domestic Violence Clause would be interpreted
to cover spousal abuse merely because the contemporary conventional
meaning of the phrase "domestic violence" includes spousal abuse.
They contemplate not an evolution of meaning, but the substitution
of one meaning for another. During the founding period, as today,
the word "domestic" had a meaning of "belonging to the house," and
another, derivative meaning of "not foreign."' 3 Even in my imaginary
history of the Domestic Violence Clause, it would not be plausible to
substitute one of these meanings for the other.4
Still, Balkin does clearly indicate that any application of the
Domestic Violence Clause to spousal abuse would be inconsistent
with original meaning. 5 If Balkin is right that the original meaning of
8. The phrasing of the Domestic Violence Clause ("shall protect ... on Applica-
tion ....") suggests that states can actually command the federal government to take
action under the Clause. However, by analogy with the Guarantee Clause, also in Article
IV, Section 4, courts could deem it a political question what action, if any, the federal
government must take. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992)
(giving overview of political question doctrine with respect to Guarantee Clause, while
suggesting that perhaps not all claims under Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
12. Perhaps the leading authority on the Domestic Violence Clause is Judge Jay S.
Bybee, who has also gained some renown for his other work. In Insuring Domestic
Tranquility, supra note 7, then-Professor Bybee relied on the Domestic Violence Clause to
argue for the restriction of federal authority over crime.
13. In SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1814),
(Domestic is defined as "belonging to the house; private, not foreign; intestine.").
14. I do not say that such a substitution can never be plausible.
15. Balkin, Framework Originalism, supra note 2, at 552. In Semantic Originalism,
Solum appears to agree that any application of the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal
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the constitutional term "domestic violence" was "riots or
insurrections," then the evolution in meaning I have imagined would
certainly involve a departure from original meaning. And if this
departure from original meaning seems acceptable, in my imaginary
history, Balkin's domestic violence example no longer supports his
principle of fidelity to original semantic meaning; his example is
transformed into a counterexample.
B. Original Meaning and Original Expected Applications
But what if Balkin is not right about the original meaning of
"domestic violence"? Some readers will by now have begun to
consider a move often made by "new originalists" such as Balkin and
Solum: drawing a line between original meaning and original
expected applications. Maybe the original meaning of the
constitutional term "domestic violence" was not, as suggested by
Balkin, "riots or insurrections"6; maybe those were merely expected
applications of the term. Maybe the original meaning of the
constitutional term "domestic violence" was "violence internal to a
state," so that spousal abuse was, from the very beginning, embraced
within the semantic meaning of the Domestic Violence Clause."
Spousal abuse was not initially an expected application of the Clause,
abuse would be inconsistent with original meaning. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra
note 4, at 3-4, 64-65, 172. However, in a subsequent blog post on an early version of this
Essay, Solum allows that application of the Clause to spousal abuse might be consistent
with original meaning. Lawrence B. Solum, Stein on the Domestic Violence Clause & the
Fixation of Original Meaning, LEGAL THEORY BLOG, May 29, 2009, http://lsolum.
typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/05/stein-on-the-domestic-violence-clause-the-fixatin-of-
original-meaning.html.
16. The drafting history of the Domestic Violence Clause makes it hard to argue that
the original meaning of the term "domestic violence" was simply "insurrections." At the
Constitutional Convention, the Southern states sought to substitute the word
"insurrections" for the term "domestic violence." Voting in favor of this proposal were
Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and New Jersey. Opposed were
Maryland and all the Northern and middle states except New Jersey. The proposed
change failed by a vote of 6-5, one of the rare times when the slavery interest was defeated
at the Convention. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 467 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
17. While allowing that this interpretation of original meaning has some plausibility,
Solum observes that the Domestic Violence Clause speaks of "protect[ing]" states from
domestic violence. Solum, Stein on the Domestic Violence Clause, supra note 15. He
suggests that "it is unclear whether the state could be protected against violence which is
directed by one spouse against another spouse." Id. However, riots, which by Balkin's
assumption are within the original meaning of the Domestic Violence Clause, can also
involve private violence not directed against state authority. If a state can be protected
from riots, perhaps it can also be protected from spousal abuse.
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but a constitutional provision can be given a legal meaning different
from its original expected application, without doing violence to the
hard core of original semantic meaning. Whether to extend meaning
in this way may be a matter of "constitutional construction," 8 and
changing attitudes can be relevant to constitutional construction.
Under this expansive view of the original meaning of "domestic
violence," Balkin would be wrong in one particular determination of
original meaning, but his principle of fidelity to original semantic
meaning would be untouched by my extended domestic violence
example. Indeed, it could be argued that the only reason it is possible
to imagine a plausible application of the Domestic Violence Clause to
spousal abuse is that the original semantic meaning of the Domestic
Violence Clause really did include spousal abuse.
I do not believe that the principle of fidelity to original semantic
meaning is due complete respect. However, I will not here attempt to
defend or even delineate my view on what constraints the language of
the Constitution should impose. I will instead offer a number of
interrelated observations on original meaning and original expected
application, provoked by the domestic violence example.
First, the domestic violence example is an ironic demonstration
of how unconstrained the originalist method becomes when original
meaning is divorced from original expected applications. Balkin and
Solum are two of the three foremost originalist exponents of drawing
a line between original meaning and original expected applications
(the third being Randy Barnett).' 9 Balkin, and to an extent Solum as
well," sees the Domestic Violence Clause as an example of an
originalist constitutional constraint: the Clause does not apply to
spousal abuse. But under an originalism that does not consider
original expected applications to be binding (which might be called
unexpected-applications originalism), even that constraint can be
overcome: the original meaning of the constitutional term "domestic
18. See RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118-27 (2004); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 4, at
67-69.
19. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
293 (2007); Randy Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007);
Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 4, at 20.
20. See supra note 15.
[Vol. 37:1
THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CLAUSE
violence" can be determined to be "violence internal to a state,"
which permits application to spousal abuse.'
Second, the domestic violence example shows how unclear the
line is between original meaning and original expected application.
Even though Balkin and Solum are the strongest advocates of
drawing this line, they do not situate themselves at the outer range of
linguistic possibility. Some things that might be considered mere
expected applications, they consider meaning.
Third, there is something natural about including expected
applications in original meaning; one has to make an effort to divorce
them. That may be why Justice Scalia can claim that he, too, respects
original semantic meaning rather than original expected
applications;22 he just seems to think that almost all expected
23
applications are part of original meaning.
Finally, for theorists who reside neither at the outer limit of
linguistic possibility nor at the inner (Scalian) limit of linguistic
possibility, originalism becomes highly manipulable. I confess that I
do not know whether "riots or insurrections" was the original
meaning or merely the original expected application of the
constitutional term "domestic violence." I suspect that if any matter
of policy turned on the answer, my linguistic interpretation would
follow my policy preference.
C. Common-Law Constitutionalism and the Domestic Violence Clause
It might be wondered whether I am offering a criticism or a
compliment when I remark how unconstrained and manipulable
21. Balkin and Solum, of course, would not quarrel with the general point that
unexpected-applications originalism is less constrained than expected-applications
originalism.
22. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 144 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
23. Scalia writes:
Is it a denial of equal protection on the basis of sex to have segregated toilets in
public buildings, or to exclude women from combat? I have no idea how
Professor Dworkin goes about answering such a question. I answer it on the
basis of the 'time-dated' meaning of equal protection in 1868. Unisex toilets and
women assault troops may be ideas whose time has come, and the people are
certainly free to require them by legislation; but refusing to do so does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because that is not what 'equal protection of
the laws' ever meant.
Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 148-49 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
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originalism becomes when original meaning is divorced from original
expected applications. As a nonoriginalist,24  don't I want
constitutional interpretation to be unconstrained and manipulable?
Yes and no. I do not want constitutional interpretation to be
constrained by original expected applications, and I consider
unexpected-applications originalism (if it can properly be called
originalism) to be a definite improvement over expected-applications
originalism.25 However, I do want constitutional interpretation to be
constrained by precedent, to a greater extent than most originalists
do.
26
The current judicial practice of constitutional interpretation has a
considerable element of common-law constitutionalism, as lamented
by Justice Scalia,27 and as celebrated by Professor David Strauss'
Suppose that the settled legal interpretation of the constitutional term
"domestic violence" is "riots or insurrections." 29  Common-law
constitutionalism would not constrain the Supreme Court from
applying the Domestic Violence Clause to spousal assaults a hundred
years from now, but it would substantially constrain the Court from
applying the Clause to spousal assaults tomorrow. If, by contrast, we
24. See Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J. __
(forthcoming 2010).
25. I question whether those who depart from original expected applications as much
as Balkin and Barnett should be considered originalists, but that issue is beyond the scope
of this Essay.
26. While originalists differ among themselves in their respect for precedent, I believe
it is fair to say that they are, on average, less respectful of precedent than nonoriginalists.
For the views of the "new originalists" Barnett and Solum, see Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedent With Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 257 (2005) (anti-precedent); and Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in
Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155 (2006) (pro-precedent). Among the two self-proclaimed
originalists on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia is known to be far more respectful of
precedent than Justice Thomas. For Scalia's view, see SCALIA, supra note 22, at 138-40
(accepting stare decisis as limitation on originalist method).
27. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 22, at 3.
28. See David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 969 (2008); David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 299 (2005); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and
Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
29. That, at any rate, seems close to the interpretation the Court gave the Domestic
Violence Clause in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876)-not the most
revered precedent in the constitutional canon, to be sure.
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adopt an originalist approach, and if we become convinced that the
original semantic meaning of the constitutional term "domestic
violence" was "violence internal to a state," then it can seem that the
Clause must apply to spousal abuse tomorrow.3 °  I prefer the
common-law constitutionalist approach that constrains over the short
term, but not the long term. I also endorse Strauss's view that the
normative arguments that drive constitutional partisans should be
expressed openly rather than being submerged in historical-linguistic
debates about such matters as whether "riots or insurrections" was
the original meaning or merely the original expected application of
the Domestic Violence Clause.31
II. Solum on the Domestic Violence Clause
As discussed above, Balkin uses the domestic violence example
to support a normative principle: courts should respect original
semantic meaning. In Semantic Originalism,32 Solum endorses this
principle as well. Solum also uses the domestic violence example to
support a thesis about language: his "fixation thesis" that the
linguistic or semantic meaning of constitutional provisions is fixed at
the time of their origin.33 The Constitution, Solum believes, cannot
have any semantic meaning other than its original semantic meaning.
In the course of defending his fixation thesis, Solum considers
the significance of changes in the legal meaning of the Constitution,
or as he puts it, changes in the "effective legal meaning" or "legal
effect" of the Constitution. Solum draws on the domestic violence
example to argue that changes in legal meaning do not involve
changes in semantic meaning:
Some readers may attempt to resist the fixation thesis by
appealing to the apparent ability of readers to assign a new
meaning to old texts. For example, we could say that the phrase
"domestic violence" has a contemporary sense in which it
means "spouse abuse." If the Supreme Court stipulated that
this was the meaning of "domestic violence" in the Constitution
and if other officials and citizens acquiesced in the newly
30. On this analysis, it would not be a matter of construction.
31. See Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, supra note 28.
32. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 4, at 2.
33. "[T]he fixation thesis is the claim that [the] semantic content of the Constitution
(the linguistic meaning of the Constitution) is fixed at the time of adoption." Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted).
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stipulated meaning, the legal effect of that phrase in the
Constitution would be determined by the new meaning ....
But, Solum concludes,
No one sensible could think that telling a lie with authority to
enforce the legal consequences of the lie makes the lie true.
The power of the Supreme Court to create legal fictions or
tell lies about the meaning of the Constitution cannot change
the semantic content of the constitutional text. Given the
institutions of judicial review and vertical stare decisis, the
Supreme Court can change the effective legal meaning of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court could.., adopt "spouse
abuse" as the meaning of the phrase "domestic violence." But
it is simply an error to draw from this fact the further conclusion
that the semantic content of the Constitution of 1789 is thereby
changed. Legal fictions and lies do not change semantic facts.35
In my view, the change in legal meaning that Solum hypothesizes
contradicts his fixation thesis. The Supreme Court, he assumes, gives
the constitutional term "domestic violence" a new legal meaning, and
people acquiesce." But the new legal meaning is based on, and
embodies, a new semantic meaning. Therefore, the constitutional
term "domestic violence" has taken on a new semantic meaning. The
original semantic meaning may still be relevant to various people
(historians, originalists), but the term has a new semantic meaning as
well.
Though I am not persuaded by Solum's use of the domestic
violence example, I believe the example may lend his fixation thesis
unwarranted credibility. The example evokes both linguistic
intuitions and intuitions about proper legal results. As previously
indicated, my intuitions about proper legal results (what I will call my
normative intuitions) can accept the gradual expansion of the
constitutional term "domestic violence" to include violence within the
home, but they cannot accept the mere substitution of the meaning
"spousal abuse" or "violence in the home" for the meaning "riots or
insurrection" or "violence internal to a state." As to the mere
substitution of meaning hypothesized by Solum, my normative
intuitions and my linguistic intuitions point in different directions.




recognize that a new semantic meaning has attached to the
constitutional text.
For some, however, the normative undesirability of making the
switch Solum hypothesizes may affect their linguistic intuitions.
Because the switch seems silly, they may be more disposed to accept
Solum's view that it does not involve a new semantic meaning, but
rather a lie or a mistake. In general, if Solum defends his fixation
thesis by considering only silly examples of a purported change in the
semantic meaning of the Constitution (and he does appear to
consider only silly examples),37 his fixation thesis may benefit from a
conflation of linguistic intuition and normative intuition.
Solum's fixation thesis is an impossibility thesis; he denies that
the Constitution can have any linguistic meaning other than its
original meaning. All new meaning is excluded, not just silly or
ridiculous new meaning. Solum should therefore confront examples
as to which many people believe that the semantic meaning of the
Constitution could have changed and should have changed. Suppose
that the Federalists under President John Adams were right that the
original meaning of the constitutional term "freedom ... of the press"
allowed the government to prosecute its critics for seditious libel.38
We now all interpret "freedom of the press" more broadly.39 Hasn't
the meaning changed? If Solum were to confront such examples, he
would presumably take the same position that he takes with respect
to the domestic violence example: we are making a mistake or lying
to ourselves if we think the constitutional term "freedom of the
press" has experienced a change in meaning. But this position may
seem less persuasive as to changes in meaning that have plausibly
occurred than as to silly hypothetical changes in meaning.
A final note on terminology: Some originalists, prominently
including Solum, have embarked on a campaign to obtain sole
possession of the word "interpretation." The word "interpretation,"
they believe, should only be used to denote the determination of
original meaning, or original semantic meaning.0 But the word
37. He also hypothesizes that the word "speech," in conventional usage, loses its
current meaning and comes to refer to the beats in rap music. Id. at 94.
38. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 To THE WAR ON TERRORISM 39-41 (2004).
39. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) ("Although the [1798]
Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day
in the court of history.").
40. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 4, at 67-69. Balkin has given partial
support to this view. See Balkin, Framework Originalism, supra note 2, at 15.
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"interpretation," when attached to the word "constitution," carries
highly normative connotations about the correct determination of a
legal result, connotations that do not accompany the non-tendentious
phrase "determination of original meaning." The common usage of
the word "interpretation" is such that if an originalist says "X is the
correct interpretation of the Constitution," it has far more normative
force than if he says, non-tendentiously, "X is the original meaning of
the Constitution." The originalist linguistic imperialists would like to
commandeer all the normative force of the word "interpretation" for
themselves; they would invite nonoriginalists, such as myself, to say
things like "The Supreme Court should adopt position X, even
though it is contrary to the correct interpretation of the
Constitution." While I admire the audacity of this invitation, I must
respectfully decline. As the word "interpretation" has powerful
connotations about the bottom-line determination of legal results, I
will continue to use that word, in the phrase "constitutional
interpretation," to denote the bottom-line determination of legal
results.
Conclusion
Balkin draws on the Domestic Violence Clause to argue that the
meaning of the Constitution should not change. Solum additionally
uses the Domestic Violence Clause to argue that the meaning of the
Constitution cannot change. Unlike Solum, I believe that the
meaning of the Constitution can change; unlike Balkin and Solum, I
believe that constitutional meaning should change. Of course, I do
not claim to have established my own positions by critiquing their
treatment of a hypothetical example involving the Domestic Violence
Clause. I hope, however, that I have managed to chip away
somewhat at their example, which initially seemed so strongly to
favor originalism.
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